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Modernization theory rests on the as-
sumption that to be modern is to be 
secular, and that state secularism and 
societal secularization is an inevitable 
outcome of modernization processes. 
Developments have long since demon-
strated the fallacy of these assumptions. 
The organizing master narrative for so-
cial science analysis of developments 
in the “Muslim world” since the Iranian 
Revolution of 1979 and the re-Islamization “from below” of large parts of 
the “Muslim world” since then has, if anything, been that of an Islamic re-
surgence which sweeps away everything that stands in its way. Hence, in 
a by no means uncharacteristic assertion, Mahmood sweepingly claims 
that there had been “two decades of the ascendance of global religious 
politics” prior to September 11 2001.1
Such master narratives provide powerful explanatory paradigms and 
historical narratives for the organization and structuring of disparate 
experiences. But much like modernization theory, these particular mas-
ter narratives tend to start from the inherently flawed epistemological 
premise that there is but one “royal road” to the understanding of Mus-
lims and the “Muslim world.” More often than not, they miss the fact 
that the secular and the religious are deeply implicated in one another 
in any given societal context, and the extent to which resurgent Islam 
and re-Islamization are in themselves phenomena of secularization—
the latter understood as an increasing differentiation of spheres.2 Nor 
does it provide a useful framework for distinguishing between secular-
ism as a theory and a practice in particular contexts, or for that matter 
for distinguishing between nominal and practising Muslims.
Prominent post-structuralist and post-colonial anthropologists like 
Asad and Mahmood3 have provided legitimacy for the construction of 
these master narratives. Asad and Mahmood both tend to posit Mus-
lims as pre-eminently and determinatively religious, and to see Islam 
as a religious tradition which articulates a radical difference or alterity 
to secular liberalism. This is apparent from Asad’s statement to the ef-
fect that “the Islamic tradition ought to lead us to question many of 
the liberal categories themselves” and Mahmood’s call for a “critical 
scrutiny” of liberal notions from the “standpoint of Islamic traditions.”4 
Such statements are premised on a notion of secularism and liberal-
ism as being of “Western” origin and anathema to Islamic traditions—as 
well as a fundamental “ethnographic refusal” to engage with Muslims’ 
actual experiences with secularism and liberalism, and to explore non-
“Western” genealogies of secularism. Asad argued in his programmatic 
statement from 1986 that “one should go beyond drawing parallels 
and attempt a systematic exploration of differences” between Islamic 
and other traditions. Furthermore, “for the anthropologist of Islam, the 
proper theoretical beginning is therefore an instituted practice … into 
which Muslims are inducted as Muslims.”5 
Foundational religious texts play a crucial role in Asad’s concept of 
an Islamic tradition, as they do for Mahmood. The problem here is of 
course that Asad’s formulation of what a supposed anthropology of 
Islam ought to be about predetermines the outcome. The anthropol-
ogy of Islam, it seems, ought primarily to be about practising Muslims 
and their embodied and discursive engagement with foundational re-
ligious texts, period. But surely the question as to whether a Muslim is 
practicing or not is a question to be determined in the course of the 
empirical enquiry, and not at the outset? This is perhaps particularly 
so in contexts in which Muslims live as 
minorities in secular and liberal socie-
ties, contexts in which the “cognitive 
contamination” from non-religious 
normative models can seldom be shut 
completely out, and in which religious 
faith as practice ceases to form part of 
the doxic or “taken-for-granted.” 
Perhaps it is time to replace the mis-
nomer of the so-called “anthropology 
of Islam” with the “anthropology of Muslims.” In my Ph.D. dissertation6 
I problematize master narratives premised on the incompatibility be-
tween secularism and Islamic traditions by exploring the responses of 
Muslims in Cape Town, South Africa to the advent of a post-apartheid 
society. Post-apartheid South Africa is a society in which dominant 
sections of the new social and political elites subscribe to the secular 
and liberal values enshrined in the 1996 Constitution, and it is also a 
society which has seen a process of a contested secularization since 
1994. My findings suggest that there has been an ambiguous accom-
modation on the part of Cape Muslims and their ulama with the new 
social and political regime. This ambiguous accommodation is based 
on an appreciation of the fact that the post-apartheid state is prem-
ised on a secular principle of neutrality as between religions and their 
adherents—which the apartheid state, with its privileging of reformist 
Protestant Christianity, was not. Muslim ulama have selectively appro-
priated a discourse of human rights and constitutional values in order 
to advance the religious rights of Muslims in the realm of family law 
and in state institutions, at the same time as they have contested the 
constitutional and human rights values that they see as anathema to 
Islamic normativities—such as the legalization of same-sex practice 
and relationships, abortion, and pornography and the abolition of the 
death penalty. But this ambiguous accommodation is also based on 
the fact that secularization among Muslims in hybrid and multicultural 
Cape Town predates the advent of a post-apartheid society, and is im-
plicated in the practical accommodations between Muslims and non-
Muslims in underprivileged communities, townships, and informal set-
tlements on the Cape Flats (the vast area outside the City Bowl where 
most of Cape Town’s population live). Cape Muslims are therefore in 
profound ways entangled in the secular logic of a secularizing state.
A short history of Muslims in Cape Town
Cape Town, with an estimated 3.1 million inhabitants, has had a Mus-
lim presence at least since 1658. It is home to approximately 47% of 
South Africa’s Muslim population. Muslims made up 1.46% of the na-
tional population in 2001. Cape Muslims are predominantly Shafi‘i. The 
largest and most influential Sunni ulama organization in Cape Town is 
the Muslim Judicial Council (MJC), established in 1945. In Muslim social 
imaginaries in South Africa, Cape Muslims are, much like the cityscape 
of Cape Town itself, often thought of as “liberal.” This imagined “liberal-
ness” makes reference to the fact that many Cape Muslim females are 
employed outside the home (by choice or necessity), that there is often 
a remarkable absence of strict gender segregation in private and pub-
lic spheres among Cape Muslims, but also to a more lax and permis-
sive attitude toward morality and sexuality among Cape Muslims of all 
social strata (but perhaps more so among Muslims in underprivileged 
and mixed neighbourhoods in Cape Town). Cape Town’s Muslims are 
fractured by social status, ethnicity, and religious orientation. A view to 
Secularism is often seen as anathema to Islamic 
traditions. The findings from research on the 
responses of Muslims in Cape Town to state 
secularism and societal secularization in post-
apartheid South Africa indicate the emergence 
of an ambiguous accommodation between 
Muslims and the secular state, and thus 
challenge reductionist assumptions about the 
relation of Islamic traditions to secularism. 
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lonial and non-“Western” genealogies of secular-
ism, and the actual experiences with secularism 
of Muslims in particular contexts (particularly in 
minority contexts), and in so doing, subscribing 
to what essentially amounts to an ethno-centric 
view of secularism.7 There can be no doubt that a 
secular state like the South African post-apartheid 
state is premised on a differentiation between 
secular and religious spheres, and as such delimits 
the legitimate expression of religious sentiments 
in the public and political spheres. But given the 
fact that 86% of South Africans declare them-
selves as religious, South African state secularism 
cannot be seen as determinative on the level of 
individual consciousnesses, and essentially re-
mains contested. State secularism and societal 
secularization in post-apartheid South Africa can 
in a certain sense be seen as having set in motion 
a process of re-Islamization among Cape Muslims. 
It finds its most visible articulations among Cape 
Muslims in the expansion of religious education, 
the proliferation of Muslim media, in greater iden-
tification with a global imagined community of 
Muslims, the ummah, and an increased emphasis 
on appropriate dress for female Muslims. 
If we venture beyond the ideologization of sec-
ularism and of Islamic traditions in the works of 
some post-structuralist anthropologists of Islam, 
we might discover that secularism has in some 
contexts provided a defence of the rights of reli-
gious minorities of the kind that Muslims in post-
apartheid South Africa constitute. For all their 
contestations of a particular law sanctioned by 
the Constitution of 1996 and of the secularization of South African soci-
ety in general, it seems that it is precisely this that mainstream Muslims 
in contemporary South Africa have come to discover. Secularism may 
therefore in practice, if not necessarily in theory, be more “Islamic” than 
what is commonly assumed.
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the effect that Islam is determinative for the actions and behaviours of 
Cape Muslims therefore does not bring us very far. Most Cape Muslims 
are classified as coloureds for the purposes of censuses, followed by 
South African Indians and black Africans. The latter group has seen the 
strongest growth in the number of adherents to Islam, as obstacles to 
proselytization and interaction under apartheid have disappeared, and 
as Muslims from other parts of the African continent have established 
a presence in Cape Town. 
Research on Islam in prison
An exploration of the transformation of the religious rights of Muslim 
inmates in a prison in Cape Town provide vistas to the ways in which 
post-apartheid secularism has generated new openings for the recog-
nition of what many Cape Muslims regard as “Muslim religious rights” 
within state institutions. Under apartheid, the prison service had been 
an instrument in the state-supported empowerment of white Afrikan-
ers: in 1990, 90% of senior prison officers where white, and many of 
these had a background in Christian churches. In 2005, I found that 
there were only a handful of prison warders and officials who were 
Muslims. Christian chaplains still had a privileged position within the 
prison service. Still, there had been significant achievements as far as 
the recognition of Muslim inmates rights to religious practice in the 
course of the 1990s. These were the heydays of “human rights talk” in 
post-apartheid South Africa. Guarantees for freedom of religion for in-
mates in South African prisons were provided under Section 14 (1–4) 
of the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998. On the basis of tactical 
alliances with post-apartheid prison managers with a background in 
the anti-apartheid struggle and as such sympathetic towards the in-
vocation of human rights discourse, and in spite of strong internal op-
position to these measures, voluntary Muslim prison imams and the 
ulama organizations on the outside had managed to ensure the rights 
of Muslim inmates to regular provisions of halal (ritually clean) food, to 
being serviced by a Muslim chaplain (from 1998), and to the use of a 
prison hall for the purpose of weekly zuhr (midday) prayer (from 1999). 
Post-apartheid secularism and the nominal state commitment to neu-
trality between the adherents of the various religions in South Africa 
that this entails in this case seems to have provided a grounds from 
which arguments for greater religious rights for South African Muslims 
could be made. 
New framework for thinking the secular and religious
Inasmuch as the post-structuralist and post-colonial anthropology 
of Islam of, for instance, Asad and Mahmood is premised on a fixation 
with Muslims’ radical alterity and difference and is anchored in the view 
that secularism is “Western” in its origins, it constitutes secularism as 
anathema to Islamic traditions. It can only do so by neglecting pre-co-
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